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Complexity Theory and Agile Policy-Making
Graham Room
Introduction
Complexity thinking has provided new insights into economic prob-
lems. Nevertheless, in many respects, it has also reminded us of older 
approaches to economic analysis that have long been sidelined by eco-
nomic orthodoxy but are now being rediscovered. This chapter fi rst 
considers how complexity thinking calls into question some of the 
central tenets of orthodox economic analysis before going on to pro-
vide three examples of the “agile policy-making” that this new per-
spective provides. Lastly, it points out some of the profound institu-
tional changes needed to produce an effi cient economic policy in a 
world of limited predictability and control.
From equilibrium to the self-organizing economy
The economic orthodoxy of the 20th century taught that free markets, if 
left to themselves, would tend to equilibrium. They would also deliver 
effi ciency and wealth, which would be distributed to the different fac-
tors of production according to their respective contributions. This or-
thodoxy was intellectually appealing because it could be couched in the 
sort of mathematics that had elevated physics to its enviable status as 
“queen of the sciences.” It appealed to business and its advocates be-
cause it seemed to endorse the value of their contribution to society, and 
it provided them with a rationale for fending off government regulation.
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The middle of the century saw other voices displacing this ortho-
doxy. Schumpeter (1942) pointed to the waves of “creative destruction” 
set in motion by capitalist entrepreneurs. Keynes, however, warned 
that these entrepreneurs would sit on their hands in hard and uncer-
tain times instead of investing in new technologies and products. Pro-
grams of public expenditure were needed, he added, that would not 
only raise demand in the short term, but also signal government com-
mitment to an economy that would grow, thereby providing entrepre-
neurs with the confi dence themselves to invest (Keynes 1936). 
The Keynesian Revolution thus endorsed an active role for govern-
ment. So did the New Deal in the United States. So did the postwar 
programs of welfare reform across the Western world. So did the Mar-
shall Plan, rebuilding the economies of Western Europe. Neverthe-
less, the 1970s proved the high-water mark for this view of govern-
ment and economy. Intellectually, it was sidelined by the mathematical 
sophistication of a resurgent economic orthodoxy (Bliss 2010). Politi-
cally, the proponents of collective welfare and active government were 
in retreat before the advocates of corporate interests.
Equilibrium thinking in economics was supposed to raise eco-
nomics to the level of physics as a rigorous science. Complexity think-
ing – coming out of the natural and informational sciences – ques-
tions whether equilibrium thinking will suffi ce, even for physics. It is 
in this sense that complexity thinking has posed a new and funda-
mental challenge to economic orthodoxy in recent decades. Alongside 
this, the fi nancial and economic crisis of 2008 put public confi dence 
in the market system dramatically in question. It is the conjunction of 
these intellectual and political challenges that now promises a funda-
mental shift in our economic view of the world.
The literature on complex systems is concerned with the dynamics 
of change and the forms of self-organization that emerge without any 
designer at work. The question is now: How far can these insights be 
applied – and with what, if any, modifi cations – to the functioning of 
economies?
Accounts of economies as complex systems have provided a plausi-
ble new basis for the political creed of economic liberalism. According 
79
to writers infl uenced by Hayek, modern societies are overregulated by 
the state and must be “liberated” so that they can self-organize (Parker 
and Stacey 1994). As Desai and Ormerod (1998: 1431) summarize, for 
such writers, "[t]he complex interaction of individual agents implies 
[…] that government intervention is not needed to revive the economy 
in a depression. The natural rhythms of the system itself ensure that 
a recovery takes place.” Evolutionary models of the economy echo 
such claims. For example, Dopfer and Potts (2008) argue that govern-
ment should limit itself to promoting the creativity of citizens and 
securing the good order of the market.
Against this, as we have seen, Keynes doubted whether, under con-
ditions of uncertainty, a modern economy can – to use the language of 
complex systems – self-organize at full employment of national re-
sources and economic capacity without the active intervention of the 
state. This Keynesian perspective has been given added salience by 
the turbulence unleashed by the recent economic crisis (Skidelsky 
2009; Eatwell and Milgate 2011). In the fi nancial markets at least, 
“light touch” regulation has proved inadequate. Soros (2008) captures 
well the dynamics of the international economy as a “far-from-equilib-
rium” system, where animal spirits generate self-destructive volatility 
through fl ocking behavior.
A similar perspective has been offered by Arthur and others at the 
Santa Fé Institute (Arthur, Durlauf and Lane 1997: 16, 37). They de-
scribe a race between fi nanciers, on the one hand, who invent new 
products to escape regulation but generate volatility that undermines 
system stability, and policy-makers, on the other, who establish new 
regulatory instruments only to fi nd that the ground shifts again and 
the race starts afresh. This “arms race” within the fi nancial system 
has then spilled into the wider economy and society. As Polanyi (1944) 
warned long ago, if markets are left to “self-organize,” this seems to 
produce social consequences, such as social inequality and insecurity, 
that undermine social consent and threaten to trigger a backlash 
against the very market institutions on which prosperity depends.
This is therefore a view of the economy as a complex system quite 
different from that taken by Hayek and his disciples. The difference 
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refl ects deeper disagreements over how we are to conceptualize hu-
man agency within dynamic systems. On the one side is the view that 
human agency is a source of creativity and novelty at the micro level 
that drives technological progress within capitalism – but, beyond 
this, market and society can be left to evolve and self-organize through 
blind processes analogous to natural selection. Against this is the 
view that, under conditions of uncertainty, different social groups will 
actively strive to shape the overall direction of this self-organization, 
and public policy cannot but impinge on this struggle.
In the rest of the chapter, we will devote our attention to arriving 
at an understanding of purposive economic policy-making in a com-
plex and uncertain world.
From rational choice to agile actors
If modern economic orthodoxy has market equilibrium as one of its 
principal tenets, another is the “rational actor.” Such actors confront a 
menu of options, carrying particular costs, benefi ts and consequences, 
whose overall utility they then calculate. However, in a complex and 
evolving social and economic system, individual actors face uncer-
tainty about how the future will unfold as well as about what conse-
quences will follow from any choices they make.
There have been various attempts to take account of this “bounded 
rationality.” Although there may be incomplete information about the 
future, rational expectations theory responds that the actor knows the 
range of possible futures and the probability of each. It is more prob-
lematic if no such probabilities can be pre-assigned; this is the differ-
ence between risk and uncertainty (Simon 1969: Chapter 2). Matters 
are even worse if even the range of such possible outcomes cannot be 
confi dently delimited. 
This is not all. In the real world, it is rational for social actors not 
only to calculate costs and benefi ts, but also to act, to reshape the menu 
and thereby to make the options more attractive. These efforts – de-
pending on the resources and power at the actors’ disposal – are liable 
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to be contested by others. Nevertheless, it is hardly possible for social 
actors in complex environments to anticipate the nonlinear, dynamic 
and sometimes counterintuitive consequences of such interactions 
(Kauffman 2008: Chapter 14). This is compounded by their limited 
ability to read and anticipate the intentions of others (Jervis 1997), yet 
another form of “bounded rationality.”
It is in light of these limitations that we offer instead the notion of 
“agile action” (Room 2011: Chapter 8). The majority of our actions 
each day involve “ordinary” situations that we handle almost unthink-
ingly, using standard templates and rules of thumb. These we learn as 
members of society, adapting them to our own particular contexts. 
Here is some solid ground, a safe and predictable vantage point – al-
though this is never wholly secure in the face of adversity or unex-
pected bounty. Handling the “ordinary” situations of everyday life us-
ing standard rules of thumb leaves us free to devote most of our 
attention to novel problems and to probe terrains as yet unexplored. 
We deploy mental models as to how the world is likely to unfold and 
how we may be able to steer and shape it. This is even more demand-
ing when we are faced with fellow actors who are trying to steer it in 
quite different directions. 
This is “agile” action.10 It is when actors detect anomalous pat-
terns (including, for example, those falling outside certain critical 
thresholds) that they are alerted to the need for a response which does 
not rely on the standard templates of the habitual. These are situations 
that may present opportunities or threats of major existential signifi -
cance for the actors in question. Which matters are handled in which 
way is itself therefore fl uid; and this will vary between actors depend-
ing on their interests, resources and positional leverage.
Social actors not only probe the foggy landscape in which they fi nd 
themselves; they may also disrupt the stable ground on which others 
10 This notion of “agile action” owes much to Crouch’s discussion of “institutional 
entrepreneurs” (Crouch 2005: see esp. 67–68). Also relevant is the substantial 
 literature on experimentation under uncertainty, which is concerned with the 
“mental models” we construct as a guide to our choices of action. Notable contri-
butors include Simon (1969), Holland (1995) and North (1990).
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stand. This is why uncertainty itself tends to be socially distributed, 
with more-advantaged groups progressively displacing its burden 
onto those in a weaker position (Marris 1996: Chapter 7). Probing, 
rather than producing convergent agreement, may therefore expose 
fundamental clashes of interests instead. It follows that the mental 
models that agile actors employ are not simply “technical” assess-
ments of how the world is likely to unfold; they also embody compet-
ing moral claims as to what the world should be like and which en-
titlements and obligations social actors should respect. 
Agile policy-making
If the modern economy is an evolving, self-organizing system, but 
one in which public policy is unavoidably involved, what does this im-
ply for the role of government? How can agile policy-makers “read” 
these complex and dynamically changing terrains? What real-time 
information is at their disposal to monitor these changes? And how 
can they evaluate this and draw appropriate lessons? To explore these 
questions, we can analyze three cases of policy-making. 
Evidence-based policy-making 
How can policy-makers make good decisions? At least in the Anglo-
Saxon world, the most common answer nowadays is that, to be good, 
policy decisions should be “evidence-based.” According to this view, it 
is only such policies that are likely to be effective; and with evidence to 
back them up, they can expect to command public support.
The advocates of Evidence-Based Policy-Making (EBPM) have 
been concerned, fi rst and foremost, with evidence of the outcome or 
“impact” of a particular intervention. The randomized controlled trial 
(RCT) has a long-established reputation in the fi eld of clinical inter-
ventions and pharmaceuticals; but, in recent decades, this has also 
been held up as the gold standard for assessing effectiveness across a 
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wide range of public-policy interventions (Room 2013). However, it 
has been subjected to a range of criticisms, including by Pawson 
(2006), who questions the language of “impact” as far as social-policy 
interventions are concerned. He insists that such interventions and 
their impacts depend heavily upon the social actors with whom they 
“engage”: both the street-level bureaucrats who deliver the interven-
tions and the members of the target population. 
Pawson – like RCT – focuses on a single policy intervention viewed 
in isolation. Policy interventions, however, are launched into a crowded 
policy “ecosystem.” Previous interventions shape the fears and hopes 
with which the public views any new initiative. These forerunners are 
not the mere detritus of policy enthusiasms long forgotten; in many 
cases, their champions are still at work, shaping the landscape onto 
which the new policy is launched. More than this, the new interven-
tion is liable to trigger dynamic synergies with some elements of the 
policy system, to generate forms of “co-evolution” producing changes 
in direction that cannot be understood as the simple “impact” of the 
new intervention. Alternatively, the new intervention may be unable 
to break into policy ecosystems that are resilient against such new 
“invaders.” The policy-maker needs to be able to anticipate such dy-
namic effects – and to judge which ones will accelerate and reinforce 
his or her policy ambition as well as which ones could throw it off 
course. This is critical for any assessment of “what works” (Room 
2013). 
Of course, this does not necessarily mean the abandonment of 
RCT. How far these procedures can still provide useful guidance is a 
matter of practical judgment in specifi c empirical situations. In many 
situations, the dynamic synergies just discussed may be of little sig-
nifi cance. After all, some degree of uniformity and stability are precon-
ditions of all policy-making. Indeed, turbulence is not ubiquitous – if 
it were, life would hardly be possible!
This was, of course, central to the notion of “agile action” intro-
duced earlier. RCT assumes that evidence can be systematically gath-
ered so as to establish the effectiveness of any intervention, and that, 
armed with these templates, the policy actor can then deal with any 
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standard situation that he or she encounters. However, we also recog-
nized that, from this stable vantage point, it is often necessary for so-
cial actors to probe more complex terrains using mental models about 
how the world is likely to unfold and how they may be able to steer and 
shape it. In such a dynamic policy ecosystem, RCT may be quite inap-
propriate.
Moreover, this choice of our analytical approach to evidence for 
policy is not just a technical question. Rather, it also involves judg-
ments about the signifi cance of different dynamic synergies in rela-
tion to the objectives not only of policymakers, but also of other stake-
holders across the affected communities. Impact must be judged with 
reference to the various interests involved, and the weight that is given 
to those various interests involves a political judgment. Therefore, if 
policy analysts are to develop an evidence base for policy and practice, 
they must take full account of the political economy and distribution 
of power within which struggles over the future of the social and 
 political order are being waged. If they clothe this task in the language 
of technical measurement and reifi ed system dynamics, this is itself a 
political choice.
Investment in citizens 
Drawing on behavioral psychology, Thaler and Sunstein (2009) argue 
that many ordinary citizens behave irrationally, that they are prone to 
inertia, bias and short-sightedness. For this reason, they must be 
“nudged” in the direction the government deems good for them.11
We approach individual decision-making from a different vantage 
point. In a complex social and economic “ecosystem,” ordinary citi-
11 Recent contributions to the debate include John, Smith and Stoker (2009), Oliver 
(2013) and Leggett (2014), each of whom provides a useful stocktaking of this 
burgeoning literature. For a useful overview of some of the literature and debates, 
see also Delaney (2013). The House of Lords Science and Technology Committee 
(2011) reviews the practical effectiveness of “nudges,” but also their limitations 
when not used in combination with a range of other interventions.
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zens are affl icted not so much by irrationality as by uncertainty re-
garding how the future will unfold and what consequences will follow 
from any train of action they pursue. Like policy-makers, they need 
some solid ground, a suffi cient expanse that is safe and predictable. 
From these anchorages, they can then venture forth as creative and 
agile actors, shaping the world they live in, albeit on a modest scale. If 
that ground is too shrunken – in other words, if there is too much 
turbulence and uncertainty – the actor in question will “hunker down” 
and wait for times to get better. 
Clark and Heath (2014) have shown that inequality exacerbates 
anxiety across society. During the current austerity, in the United 
Kingdom at least, this has in turn produced a so-called “social reces-
sion,” with a decline in volunteering and “informal kindness.” They 
conclude (ibid.: 221; see also Orton 2015): “Until we have an economy 
that delivers fairer shares and some measure of security across  society, 
such anxiety will never be banished, and […] neither ‘general well- 
being’ nor community life is going to be safe.” 
This shifts the focus from individual psychology to political econ-
omy. It suggests that instead of nudging citizens, government should 
invest in their security and creativity as well as in those of their social, 
economic and political communities. It also recognizes that citizens’ 
failure to take up the options that government deems right for them 
may attest not to their blunders and biases, but to their disenchant-
ment with the behavior of the government itself, to their wish for 
“voice, not choice,” and to their inability to nudge government in a 
different direction. In short, it shifts the spotlight’s focus from the 
behavior of citizens to that of governments.
This also presupposes the active involvement of citizens in the 
gover nance of our social, political and economic institutions. It is not 
enough for government to provide stability and security and to invest 
in agile and creative citizens; the latter must also be able to hold 
 government to account. This means that government must be placed 
under critical scrutiny by citizens, rather than vice versa. As a result, 
citizens are given a fundamental role in both making and implement-
ing policy. A “nudge,” in contrast, gives them a role merely in the lat-
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ter – and, even then, only as consumers reacting to the choices the 
government presents them. There is little or no attempt to engage 
citizens as active, critical and responsible partners; they are deemed 
hardly up to that.
The recent direction of social policies, in the United Kingdom and 
elsewhere, has been to push as many people as possible into the mar-
ket place and to narrow the bounds of public generosity toward those 
who remain. The very governments that sing the merits of nudging 
have been passing much of the burden of austerity onto the most dis-
advantaged, thereby multiplying the uncertainties to which they are 
exposed. This is the politics of fear – and of surrender to the global 
market.
The European economy 
Economic orthodoxy has driven the policy response to the global re-
cession – and nowhere more so than in Europe. This orthodoxy tells 
governments to return to the mantras of the 1920s: balanced budgets, 
low infl ation, stable currencies and support for business. If the mass 
of the population has to suffer, they can rest assured that prosperity 
will eventually return and trickle down to them. However, a complex-
ity-inspired analysis of the contemporary economic situation suggests 
a quite different approach.
First, it is not only individual citizens who need some security and 
solid ground; the same holds true for entrepreneurs, who otherwise 
will also “hunker down” and wait for times to get better. If businesses 
are to invest in technology and people, they must have confi dence that 
there will be an economy suffi ciently buoyant to bring them a reason-
able return. As noted earlier, this was a central argument of Keynes. 
Indeed, it was a general assumption of Western governments during 
the postwar decades and lasting until the neo-liberal attack on active 
government took hold during the 1980s (Shonfi eld 1965). 
Second, as we have seen, any policy intervention unfolds within a 
dynamic policy “ecosystem.” This is true, not least, of government at-
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tempts to shore up the European economy. They reveal the counterin-
tuitive consequences of orthodox economic policies, the confl icting 
interests of the various stakeholders involved and the sanitization of 
these confl icts in the technocratic language of debt repayment. 
Twice in the last century, a harsh corset has been placed on the 
European economy in the belief that it would be the path to economic 
recovery. In 1919, the Treaty of Versailles imposed heavy reparations 
on Germany and restrictions on how it might rebuild its industrial 
base. Keynes famously condemned the Treaty in The Economic Conse-
quences of the Peace (1919). This was in part on grounds of justice – and 
the need to build a peace in which the new and democratic Germany 
would feel included. It was also because a Germany without a thriving 
economy would hardly be in a position to pay the reparations that were 
being exacted. However, it was primarily in relation to the rebuilding 
of the European economy as a whole that Keynes advanced his case: 
Europe had highly interdependent national economies, Germany’s 
was the central one, and restoring prosperity to Europe would be im-
possible if Germany remained devastated.
The Treaty established a Reparation Commission to enforce its fi -
nancial requirements. For this purpose, it was given “wide powers 
over the internal economic life of the enemy countries, who are to be 
treated henceforward as bankrupt estates to be administered by and 
for the benefi t of the creditors” (ibid: 118). As such it was likely to be-
come “an instrument of oppression and rapine” (ibid.: 123). In con-
trast, amidst the gloom, Keynes applauded the American Relief Com-
mission of 1919, which “not only saved an immense amount of human 
suffering, but averted a widespread breakdown of the European sys-
tem” (ibid.: 157). It was on such generosity that he pinned his hopes 
for rebuilding European prosperity.
In 1919, much of Europe’s infrastructure and industry lay in ruins. 
Ninety years later, its fi nancial system lay in ruins, and its economy 
and employment under grave threat. Enormous injections of public 
funds were used to prop up the fi nancial system and, in an effort to 
balance government fi nances, public spending was cut, notably on 
public services and welfare expenditures. As in 1919, new mecha-
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nisms of fi nancial administration at a European level were set in 
place. These were new rules of fi scal prudence to be enforced across 
the euro zone.
This is hardly conducive to proactive public investment programs 
of the sort that Keynes envisaged. Without these, however, the Euro-
pean Union is likely to face general defl ation and zero or low growth for 
the rest of this decade. Fiscal reform and belt-tightening will still be 
required in many countries. But this will be much easier if economic 
growth can be restarted. Keynes tells us that if we take care of growth, 
the public defi cit will take care of itself. Fiscal reform can, in any case, 
mean many things: It may mean cutting back on public services and 
support for the poor. But it can also mean cutting back on fi scal welfare 
for the rich and the closing of tax havens. Politics will be back. 
Conclusion
Complexity thinking has provided new insights into economic prob-
lems. It is concerned with the dynamics of change and the forms of 
self-organization that emerge in an economy. Yet while the order and 
regularities of social and economic life may attest in part to this self-
organization as a complex system, they attest no less to the exercise of 
power and to the success of some social actors in negotiating or im-
posing that order on others. This brings interests, power and politics 
to center stage. Complexity analysis must be combined with political 
economy (Room 2011).
This must then also inform the analysis and development of public 
policy. Civility does not “self-organize”; it must be politically constructed. 
And we cannot escape the social and political choices of our time.
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